Secure communication protocols¶
Keeping private conversations private — even when someone’s watching
Why survivors need secure communication¶
When someone is experiencing intimate partner abuse, everyday conversations can become dangerous. A controlling partner may try to read messages, listen to calls, or even install apps to monitor the survivor’s phone — often without them knowing. In these cases, how you communicate becomes just as important as what you say.
Secure communication protocols are the digital equivalent of drawing the curtains and locking the doors. They’re not perfect, but they make it much harder for an abuser — or anyone else — to snoop, tamper, or impersonate.
What a “secure protocol” actually means¶
Let’s de-jargon this. A protocol is just a set of rules computers follow to send messages back and forth. A secure communication protocol adds extra steps to keep those messages private, protected, and trustworthy.
Good protocols:
Encrypt messages so that only the sender and receiver can read them
Make sure nobody can secretly change what was said
Hide as much background information (metadata) as possible, such as who talked to whom, when, and from where
Confirm that you’re actually talking to the right person — not someone pretending to be them
You don’t need to understand the maths. You just need to know which tools use them, and how to spot the red flags.
Tools that protect conversations (and what they’re good for)¶
These apps and services use secure protocols — some better than others — and are widely used in IPA safety work.
1. Signal¶
Best for: Private messaging and calls between survivors and trusted contacts
Why it’s good: End-to-end encrypted (nobody else can read your chats), doesn’t store your contacts, can hide messages, and lets you set them to disappear automatically.
What it doesn’t do: It still needs a phone number to register. If the abuser has access to your contacts, they may see who you’re talking to.
2. Briar¶
Best for: Secure chat without internet or mobile signal
Why it’s good: Works over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi between nearby devices. Doesn’t rely on servers. No phone number, no cloud backup, no trace.
What it doesn’t do: It only works if both people are using it and are fairly nearby. Not for long-distance chatting.
3. Session¶
Best for: Anonymous, private messaging without revealing your identity
Why it’s good: Doesn’t require a phone number or email. Uses a Tor-like system to bounce messages through a network for anonymity.
What it doesn’t do: Can be slower than other apps. Still relatively new.
4. ProtonMail (and ProtonDrive)¶
Best for: Sending sensitive files and emails
Why it’s good: Encrypted email service based in Switzerland. Two ProtonMail users get automatic encryption. With ProtonDrive, you can also share encrypted files.
What it doesn’t do: If the recipient doesn’t use ProtonMail, you’ll need to use a password to protect the message manually.
5. WhatsApp¶
Best for: General messaging when Signal isn’t an option
Why it’s OK: Also uses the Signal Protocol for encryption. Easy to use and familiar.
What it doesn’t do: Owned by Meta (Facebook), which may log who you message, even if it can’t read the messages. Not the best for high-risk situations.
Real-world examples in the IPA context¶
A survivor wants to reach out to a support worker without leaving traces on their phone. They use Signal, set messages to disappear after 1 hour, and disable message previews on the lock screen.
A shelter staff member helps a new arrival contact their friend without using mobile data. They connect two devices using Briar and show how to delete the app afterwards.
An abuser has cloned a survivor’s WhatsApp account by scanning their QR code. Support workers move conversations to Session and show the survivor how to lock their phone and app with a PIN.
A survivor emails legal documents to a solicitor. Both use ProtonMail, or the survivor protects the attachments with a password and shares it over Signal.
A concerned friend abroad wants to help without tipping off the abuser. They install Signal and agree on a code phrase that signals danger without saying it outright.
What secure protocols can’t protect against¶
Even the most advanced protocols won’t help if:
The abuser has physical access to the device (and can read messages as they appear)
Spyware or stalkerware is installed — meaning they see everything, no matter the app
The survivor is coerced into unlocking their phone or showing messages
Conversations are saved, screenshotted, or forwarded by mistake
In short: the protocol protects the message, not the device. This is why secure communication is always part of a wider digital safety plan.
Quick tips for survivors and support workers¶
Use tools with disappearing messages and no previews
Always assume the current device may be compromised — start fresh where possible
Encourage use of PINs or biometric locks on messaging apps
Teach how to delete apps safely and clear message history
Agree on code words or phrases to signal “I’m not safe right now”
Have a backup contact method in case one gets cut off
Final thought¶
Secure communication protocols won’t fix everything. But they can make surveillance harder, buy precious time, and offer some breathing room to survivors navigating terrifying situations. The more we normalise their use — among support workers, friends, and families — the more we tip the balance of power.