Laptop loss or theft¶
Trigger¶
A team member reports their work laptop as lost or stolen.
First: assess the risk¶
The severity depends on two things: whether full disk encryption was enabled, and what the device had access to at the time of loss.
Ask immediately:
Is full disk encryption enabled? (FileVault on macOS, BitLocker on Windows.) If uncertain, treat it as not encrypted.
Was the device logged into production systems, cloud consoles, or code repositories at the time of loss?
Was a password manager or credentials file accessible on the device?
If disk encryption is confirmed active and the device was locked at the time of loss: data-at-rest exposure is low. The active session and credential exposure still need addressing.
Immediate actions¶
Revoke all SSH keys that were stored on or generated from the laptop. Check
~/.ssh/id_*and any keys added to authorised hosts in recent months (offboarding and SSH key setup and rotation cover the method).Invalidate browser sessions for critical accounts. Most providers offer “sign out all other sessions” in account security settings:
AWS: sign out of all sessions in IAM or via the console
GitHub: Settings, Sessions, revoke others
Google: myaccount.google.com, Security, Your devices
Revoke any API keys or tokens stored on the device or in browser-saved credentials.
If the device was enrolled in a mobile device management (MDM) system: trigger a remote wipe. Note: a remote wipe also destroys any locally stored evidence. If there is any reason to preserve device state, weigh this carefully before wiping.
Scope of potential exposure¶
What data was stored locally? Local database copies, customer data exports, private keys, and local
.envfiles are the highest-risk items.What was the device’s access scope at the time of loss? Review the access inventory for the team member.
Were passwords saved in the browser without a master password lock? Treat those credentials as compromised and rotate them.
Was the device used for two-factor authentication (authenticator app)? The active sessions already being revoked addresses this for most accounts, but confirm.
All clear when¶
SSH keys revoked. Active sessions invalidated across all critical accounts. Credentials rotated for anything accessible from the device. Remote wipe triggered if MDM is available.
Communication¶
If customer data, source code, or credentials giving access to personal data may have been on the device: seek legal advice on notification obligations before concluding none are required. Laptop theft with access to personal data triggers notification requirements in many jurisdictions.
Evidence¶
File a police report. The report number is often required for insurance claims and may be relevant to legal obligations. Do this within 24 hours.
Legal notes¶
Many data protection regulations treat a laptop with access to personal data as a notifiable incident when lost or stolen, regardless of whether encryption was enabled. Seek legal advice promptly.
Follow-up¶
Confirm full disk encryption status across all remaining team laptops.
Confirm MDM enrolment and remote wipe capability for all team laptops.
Review the policy on what data is permitted to be stored locally versus in cloud storage only.
Related runbooks¶
Offboarding and secret rotation for the access-revocation side, which overlaps heavily with this.
Backup verification for whether the local data lost was recoverable elsewhere.