Smart energy device focus¶

Smart energy devices are a swamp of poorly patched IoT and industrial control technologies. To operate effectively as a CNA or security analyst in this space, I would need a clear map of the terrain and its players.

Smart grid and energy IoT basics¶

The smart energy ecosystem covers devices and systems at both consumer and grid levels:

Consumer devices: smart meters, home energy management systems, EV chargers, solar inverters, smart plugs, and gateways.
Grid / industrial devices: substations, control units, PLCs, and sensors that manage energy flows.

Key communication protocols¶

Understanding the protocols used by these devices is crucial:

                         +-----------------------------------+
                         |      Inter-utility exchanges      |
                         |  (Transmission operators, TSOs)   |
                         +-----------------------------------+
                         | Protocols:                        |
                         | - ICCP / TASE.2                   |
                         | - Proprietary WAN SCADA links     |
                         +-----------------------------------+
                                         │
                                         │
                    +--------------------------------------------+
                    |        Utility / Grid Control Layer        |
                    |   Substations, control centres, SCADA      |
                    +--------------------------------------------+
                    | Protocols:                                 |
                    | - DNP3 (legacy, still widespread)          |
                    | - IEC 61850 / MMS                          |
                    | - IEC 60870-5 (Europe)                     |
                    | - OPC-UA (increasingly adopted)            |
                    +--------------------------------------------+
                                         │
                                         │
                 +---------------------------------------------------+
                 |         Field / Edge Devices (Operational)        |
                 |  Smart meters, inverters, EV chargers, RTUs, IEDs |
                 +---------------------------------------------------+
                 | Protocols:                                        |
                 | - DLMS/COSEM (smart meters, EU standard)          |
                 | - Modbus / Modbus TCP (legacy controllers)        |
                 | - OCPP (EV chargers)                              |
                 | - OPC-UA (slowly spreading)                       |
                 | - MQTT/CoAP (some new devices)                    |
                 | - LoRaWAN (low-power uplink via LoRaWAN GW →      |
                 |    Network Server at utility / cloud)             |
                 +---------------------------------------------------+
                                         │
                                         │
            +--------------------------------------------------------------+
            |          Consumer / Home IoT (End-user environment)          |
            |   Smart plugs, bulbs, thermostats, gateways, home EMS        |
            +--------------------------------------------------------------+
            | Protocols:                                                   |
            | - Zigbee / Zigbee GP, Z-Wave (mesh networks)                 |
            | - Wi-Fi based APIs (vendor cloud, REST, gRPC, etc.)          |
            | - MQTT / CoAP (increasingly common in smart hubs)            |
            | - Proprietary mobile/cloud integrations                      |
             +-------------------------------------------------------------+

Common vulnerability classes¶

Smart energy devices suffer from many of the same issues as general IoT, but with energy-specific consequences:

Default credentials, weak authentication, or hardcoded keys.
Exposed web interfaces or admin portals accessible over the network.
Buffer overflows, input validation errors, and logic flaws.
Firmware signing bypasses and insecure update mechanisms.
Poor use of TLS/cryptography: self-signed certificates, expired certs, or no certificate validation.

Understanding these classes helps anticipate what kinds of flaws may exist, even without access to specific exploits.

Ecosystem players¶

Knowing who builds and operates the infrastructure helps contextualize vulnerabilities and stakeholders:

EU smart meter manufacturers: Landis+Gyr, Iskraemeco, Itron.
EV charger vendors: Wallbox, ABB, Schneider Electric.
Grid operators and energy suppliers: regional and national utilities – they become key stakeholders if vulnerabilities affect the grid or public infrastructure.