CVEs for field / edge devices¶
CVE / Issue |
Device type / vendor |
Vulnerability summary |
Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
Smart meters |
Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve serial numbers of smart meters associated to specific user accounts. |
Leakage of unique identifiers can help attackers map infrastructure, fingerprint devices, impersonate, or scale attacks. |
|
Iocharger EV chargers (AC models) |
Default credentials used in firmware; password change not mandatory in older versions. |
Devices with weak or default auth are widespread entry points. For PoC labs, get a charger with the same firmware version to see how easily it can be abused. |
|
Schneider Electric Smart Meters |
Integer overflow via specially crafted TCP packet → device reboot. |
Availability attacks are real. For edge devices, even reboots disrupt metering, operations, and trust. |
|
EV Charging station |
Critical vulnerability: attacker can gain root via low-privilege account + crafted HTTP. Full control over charging station. |
Devastating if exploited at scale. Must test firmware’s HTTP / network interfaces carefully. |
|
Iocharger AC EV chargers |
Multiple buffer overflow flaws in CGI binaries; possible remote code execution. |
Edge firmware often uses web-interfaces / CGI; these are classic weak spots. Buffers, input validation, patching are key. |
|
EV charging firmware stack (EVerest) |
Critical flaw in open-source EV charging framework; could allow control takeover. |
Open-source stacks are double-edged: visibility is good, but also exploitation-ready if unpatched. For PoCs, use identical stack versions. |
|
Wolfbox Level 2 EV Charger |
Remote code execution, authentication bypass, buffer overflow, uninitialized variables, etc. |
This cluster shows how many edge devices are exposed via network-adjacent vectors. Great potential case studies. |
Patterns¶
Firmware version matching: Many vulnerabilities are fixed in later firmware; use the same version as reported.
Auth & default credentials: Weak passwords or default ones are common. Try login flows, web UI, APIs.
Network exposure: HTTP/Web UI, CGI binaries, local network interfaces are often the attack vectors. Capture traffic and test for them.
Buffer overflows and parsing bugs: Protocol parsing, especially for edge-protocols or custom CGI, are frequent weak spots.
Device identity leaks: Serial numbers, IDs, firmware version disclosures can aid in reconnaissance and scaling of attacks.
Remote code execution / admin access: Once into the device, what else to do? Always test for escalation paths.