Inferred PoC validation paths for CVE-2024-46041¶

Inferred, defensive validation paths that a CNA administrator most likely follows when validating CVE-2024-46041 (IoT Haat Smart Plug IH-IN-16A-S v5.16.1 — authentication bypass by capture-replay). The CVE description and severity are publicly recorded; this document reverse-engineers likely validation paths from the advisory material and the evenso speculative lab setup. Nothing here is a verbatim log; each step is phrased as what is most likely done, observed or recorded. The focus is deterministic observation, evidence collection and mitigation verification without providing exploit code or weaponised payloads. :contentReference.

Notes on severity and impact — the publicly available enrichment shows a high CVSS (8.8) and an adjacent-network attack vector, indicating an attacker on the same LAN segment can replay captured authentication frames to bypass access controls. Treat remote/cloud threats as out of scope for this specific CVE; the risk is local/adjacent network adversary.

References used to reverse-engineer these paths include the CVE-2024-46041 record entries and the researcher repository that published the original analysis material.

Environment and prerequisites (most likely present)¶

• Lab setup.

• Isolation: a dedicated VLAN and managed switch with SPAN mirroring are configured to ensure captures remain confined to the test network.

• Hardware likely present: IoT Haat Smart Plug IH-IN-16A-S (matched to v5.16.1 where feasible), dedicated lab PC for capture/analysis, Raspberry Pi to host stub services (DHCP/DNS/MQTT as needed), USB Wi-Fi adapter or Ethernet tap for network adjacency capture, serial/TTL adapter if the device exposes console access, switched power strip and surge protection.

• Software examples installed in the analysis VM: wireshark/tshark, tcpdump, aircrack/bettercap or equivalent for local network capture (use ethically and legally), nmap, curl, openssl, binwalk, static analysis tools (ghidra), replay tooling (carefully controlled scapy scripts or replay tools), and a private evidence repo.

• Public reporting indicates capture-replay is the root problem; plan tests under the assumption that replayed frames (radio or Ethernet/HTTP sessions) can authenticate the attacker if replayed verbatim.

Preparatory actions (most likely taken)¶

1. VLAN and SPAN setup: A dedicated test VLAN is configured and the plug’s port or AP is mirrored to the capture interface (SPAN). Basic verification uses ping and a short tcpdump -c 100 to ensure mirroring works.

2. Power and serial connectivity: If the plug exposes a serial header, a TTL serial link is attached and boot/kernel logs are captured to observe any debug messages during authentication or pairing sequences.

3. Network adjacency setup: If the plug is Wi-Fi based, a controlled AP is used (not the home AP) so the attacker/analyst VM can join the same SSID to simulate an adjacent adversary. If Ethernet, connect both the device and the analyst machine to the same isolated switch VLAN.

4. Evidence repo and legal log: Create a lab ticket and an evidence folder (/evidence/<labid>/). Record legal/compliance notes (adjacent-network risk, PII handling) before any capture is stored. Public sources and researcher materials are saved (for context) in the private repo.

Baseline data collection (what is likely captured)¶

• Firmware and device identifiers: obtain device-reported firmware version from UI or API and record SHA256 of any vendor firmware obtained.

• Passive capture: run tcpdump/Wireshark on the SPAN interface to capture pairing, authentication and normal control traffic (labid_baseline_<timestamp>.pcap). If the device uses radio protocols (Zigbee/802.11), capture at the link layer as required.

• Service discovery: minimal nmap or header probes to list management endpoints (HTTP/REST, MQTT, vendor ports). Save raw responses.

• Pairing/auth flow capture: capture the entire sequence of a legitimate pairing/login operation from initial packets to established session tokens — this is the artefact that an attacker will attempt to replay. These captures are the primary object for replay tests.

• Console/USB logs (if available): record any debug messages that indicate authentication acceptance events or pairing states.

Store baseline artefacts under /evidence/<labid>/baseline/.

Firmware extraction and static analysis (inferred activities)¶

• Binwalk and filesystem extraction: unpack vendor firmware to search for authentication code paths, token generation, nonce usage, or timestamp checks. Note whether the firmware includes cryptographic libraries or relies on static tokens.

• Search for strings and endpoints (auth, token, nonce, session, replay, mac, timestamp) to find plausible authentication handlers.

• Light disassembly: inspect suspected authentication routines to confirm whether nonces/timestamps are present and how they are validated. If authentication uses fixed tokens or lacks nonce checking, that confirms replay feasibility.

Decision point: if the code shows no nonce/sequence or cryptographic freshness, the test plan prioritises replay tests; if nonces or timestamps are present, the plan expands to test predictable nonce generation or flawed timestamp validation.

Targeted reconnaissance and minimal reproducibility (inferred tests)¶

Testing is incremental and fully captured. Each attempt uses strict stop conditions and preserves evidence.

Capture of legitimate auth/pairing flows¶

Capture a complete, legitimate pairing or login session end-to-end (link layer through application layer). This capture is the canonical artefact for replay testing. Save raw bytes and decoded view.

Controlled replay tests (adjacent network)¶

In the isolated lab, replay the captured authentication frames from a separate analyst VM on the same VLAN/SSID to test whether the device accepts the replay. Replays are strictly recorded and stopped on first successful authentication or on any non-deterministic behaviour. The evidence of interest: PCAP showing replayed frames and resulting server/device responses that demonstrate authentication acceptance.

Note: use replay only within the isolated lab environment and only against owned/test devices. Do not attempt public or vendor cloud replays.

Token/cookie/session analysis¶

If the device uses application-level tokens (HTTP cookies, JWTs), capture token characteristics: expiration, linking to MAC or device state, and whether the device validates replayed tokens or requires fresh handshakes. Test replay of tokens only within the sandbox and observe acceptance or rejection.

Radio-level capture/replay (if applicable)¶

If the product uses Zigbee/802.11 pairing frames susceptible to replay, capture radio frames with the appropriate sniffer (e.g. 802.11 monitor mode, or Zigbee sniffer) and attempt replay via a controlled transmitter. Observe whether pairing or command acceptance occurs after replay. Record link-layer traces and decrypt if lawful and available.

Bounded mutation tests¶

If simple replay fails, perform bounded mutations (sequence numbers, small timestamp offsets) to test whether the validation checks are tolerant or missing. All mutations are small, logged, and stopped on any abnormal device behaviour.

Evidence to collect for any test: pre/post PCAP, exact raw replayed bytes, device responses, serial console logs, and screenshots of UI state changes.

Evidence handling (probable conventions)¶

Standardised filenames and storage:

• labid_firmware_<ver>_<sha256>.bin

• labid_baseline_<timestamp>.pcap

• labid_auth_capture_<timestamp>.pcap — canonical auth capture used for replay

• labid_replay_run_<timestamp>.pcap — replay attempt capture (include before/after)

• labid_console_<event>_<timestamp>.log

• labid_http_raw_<endpoint>_<timestamp>.txt

• labid_notes_<step>_<timestamp>.md

All artefacts are committed to the private evidence repo with access controls and recorded hashes. Chain-of-custody notes are maintained in the ticket.

Mitigation verification (likely procedure)¶

• Obtain vendor fixes or mitigations (firmware update, configuration guidance). Verify provenance and checksum of vendor patch.

• Apply mitigation in the same isolated lab and re-execute the exact minimal replay steps. Compare pre/post PCAP and console logs to confirm that replayed frames no longer grant authentication or that tokens are rejected. If mitigation is configuration-based (enable secure pairing, rotate keys), document the exact config change and evidence that the device enforces freshness.

Forks in the road — decision points and how they shift the workflow¶

Hardware versus emulation¶

• Most likely chosen: hardware verification because radio timing and device firmware state can affect replay acceptance.

• Alternative: emulation first (firmware in QEMU or controlled network stack).

• How this shifts the workflow: emulation-first extracts firmware, runs the auth flow in a virtualised environment, and attempts replay against the emulated network stack. Evidence emphasises emulated serial logs and virtual network captures. Successful emulation reproduction prompts targeted hardware tests; failure in emulation triggers hardware testing to capture radio/timing specifics.

Link-layer (radio) capture versus application-layer capture¶

• Most likely chosen: capture at the layer where the device authenticates (if the advisory refers to capture-replay of network messages, start at application layer; if radio pairing is implicated, start at link layer).

• Alternative: start with application-level captures only.

• How this shifts the workflow: link-layer capture requires specialised sniffers and potentially channel coordination; data is raw and may require decryption. Application-layer testing is quicker (HTTP/MQTT logs) but may miss replayable link-layer frames that bypass higher-level protections. The evidence set and tools differ accordingly.

Passive capture then replay versus immediate active replay¶

• Most likely chosen: passive capture first to obtain canonical sessions, then controlled replay.

• Alternative: immediate active replay to stress test quickly.

• How this shifts the workflow: immediate active replay accelerates discovery but increases risk of unstable device state and may produce noisy false positives. Passive-first preserves a clear canonical capture for minimisation and reporting.

Token inspection versus blind replay¶

• Most likely chosen: inspect token/session structure before replay to understand freshness checks.

• Alternative: blind replay of captured frames to see if any are accepted.

• How this shifts the workflow: token inspection may reveal mitigations (nonces, tied MACs) and allow more precise tests; blind replay is faster but may miss why a replay succeeds or fails.

Local stub versus vendor network interaction¶

• Most likely chosen: local stub or isolated AP to control environment.

• Alternative: coordinate with vendor test infrastructure.

• How this shifts the workflow: local stubs keep all evidence in lab control; vendor coordination can validate whether cloud-side protections block replays, but requires scheduling and stricter disclosure control.

Possible technical caveats¶

• Capture quality matters: missing initial handshakes or association frames can make replays fail. Ensure capture starts before pairing begins.

• Device clocks and session lifetimes: some devices tie tokens to short lifetimes; time skew can make replay ineffective in some conditions. Document lab clock state.

• Radio regulatory and ethical constraints: radio replay must follow local law and lab policy; use shielded enclosures or wired testbeds where possible.

• No public PoC is reported in references; treat researcher repos as context and verify device behaviour independently.

Classification outcomes¶

• Reproducible — full: captured auth/session replay succeeds in granting control or privileged actions; evidence includes labid_auth_capture.pcap, labid_replay_run.pcap, console logs and firmware hash.

• Reproducible — partial: replay grants limited functionality (e.g. can toggle a switch but not access config); document exact scope.

• Not reproducible: the captured sessions fail to authenticate when replayed; include environment notes (SSID, VLAN, timestamps, firmware mismatch).

• Not reproducible — claim unsupported: repeated, documented attempts following advisory produce no effect; provide full reproduction steps and captures.

Closing remarks¶

• CVE-2024-46041 is an adjacent-network capture-replay weakness; validating it requires a canonical capture of a legitimate auth/pairing session and careful, contained replay in an isolated lab. Public metadata suggests high impact if exploited in the wild.

• The inferred path favours conservative evidence collection (canonical capture, replay trace, serial logs) and vendor coordination for remediation rather than public disclosure of replay methods.

• If confirmation is required quickly, emulation and application-layer inspection speed iteration; if definitive proof is needed for disclosure, hardware radio captures and physical tests are required.